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COMMENTS
THE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN
PENNSYLVANIA: DEATH KNELL
In the face of an overwhelming trend to eliminate the charitable
immunity doctrine,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consist-
ently refused to abolish the doctrine 2 it created back in 1888. 3 The
purpose of this paper is to forecast the future of the charitable im-
munity doctrine in Pennsylvania by analyzing cases in other areas
where the policy arguments advanced were much the same as those
raised for the doctrine of charitable immunity. Professor William
L. Prosser notes that courts are in full retreat on the charitable
immunity doctrine, and predicts its possible extinction within two
decades. 4 The doctrine as established in this state and in this country
was based upon judicial error because reliance was placed upon over-
ruled authority in England. 5 The charitable immunity doctrine has
nevertheless remained law in Pennsylvania until the present time.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court last faced the doctrine in 1961 in
Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital.6 At that time
the court held,
If the doctrine of charitable immunity is . . . no longer
suited to the times and should be dispensed with, the proper
1. PROSSER, TORTS §127 (3d ed. 1964). The author states that prior to 1942
only two or three states rejected the charitable immunity doctrine. Since then
twenty-one jurisdictions have completely repudiated the charitable immunity
doctrine, and only nine jurisdictions still confer almost complete immunity. The
remaining jurisdictions have retained it to a modified degree. For example, Ohio
and Washington terminated it to hospitals only.
2. Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital of Philadelphia,
Inc., 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769 (1961).
3. Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888).
4. PROSSER, TORTS §127 (3d ed. 1964).
5. Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888), relied
upon Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 C & F 506, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846),
which in turn relied upon dicta in Duncan v. Findlater, 6 C & F 894, 7 Eng. Rep.
934 (1839), which were expressly overruled in England by Mersey Docks
Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866). The authority
relied upon by Pennsylvania was overruled twenty-two years before it became
established in this state.
6. Supra note 2.
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
way to accomplish that end is prospectively by legislation
and not retroactively by judicial ukase. ... it is the legisla-
ture that can completely declare and promulgate public
policy and not the courts. It is to be hoped...
the attempts to eliminate the doctrine of charitable immunity
".... will assume a state of quiescence so far as further insistent court
action is concerned. Perhaps that is too much to hope for." 7 In order
to fortify the crumbling walls of the charitable immunity doctrine,
which sister states are deserting, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
laid its second emphasis upon stare decisis. Citing McDowell v.
Oyer,S the Court held that stare decisis is absolutely necessary to
any system of jurisprudence,
It is this law which we are bound to execute, and not any
'higher law', manufactured for each special occasion out of
our own private feelings and opinions. If it be wrong, the
government has a department whose duty it is to amend it,
and the responsibility is not in any wise thrown upon the
judiciary. 9
In 1888 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established the doctrine
of charitable immunity based upon the trust fund concept' 0 and in
later cases cited the inapplicability of the respondeat superior doc-
trine to charities" as another basis for immunity. These views are
attacked well by most eminent authority. 12 But both the trust fund
7. Id. at 426, 427, 172 A.2d at 770.
8. 21 Pa. 417, 423 (1853).
9. Supra note 2 at 428, 172 A.2d at 771.
10. Supra note 3.
11. Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d
59 (1946).
12. PROSSER, TORTS §127 (3d ed. 1964). The trust fund concept's "weakness
lies in the fact that It is contrary to the various decisions which have evolved
methods of making other trust funds responsible for torts committed in admin-
istering the trust, and that such funds would not be exempt in the hands of the
donor himself, he can scarcely have the power, even if it were true that he had
even the intention, to confer such immunity upon the object of his bounty. A
further fault in the justification is that it proves too much, and is inconsistent
with . . . holding charities liable for damages for breach of contract, or for
some kinds of negligence."
Professor Prosser then attacks the inapplicablility of respondeat superior
doctrine. It is based upon the fact that they derive no gain from their operation.
But the theory of respondeat superior was never based upon profit elsewhere.
It is based upon employment, direction and control in furtherance of a business.
The public policy argument is exaggerated. There Is no evidence that charities
are stifled by tort liability in states denying the immunity especially with
liability insurance today.
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and respondeat superior doctrines find their only basis in public
policy where it stems from a fear of placing a run upon the treasuries
of charity. The court seems to have realized this in the Michael case
when it laid its emphasis upon public policy and stare decisis.
The purpose of this comment is to evaluate recent case law to
determine what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will do when it is
again confronted with this doctrine. We'll look to recent cases out-
side the charitable immunity area involving public policy and stare
decisis. 13
Perhaps the first point to notice is that the majority of the court
in the Michael case was composed of Chief Justice Calvin Alvin Jones
and Justices Benjamin R. Jones, John C. Bell, Jr. and Curtis Bok.
Two of these four justices wrote concurring opinions. Justice Bell
concurred adding that the doctrine is a necessity to keep charities
from being depleted and making it a state function. The second con-
curring opinion was written by Justice Bok who wanted to overrule
the doctrine of charitable immunity on a prospective basis and joined
the majority because the minority would have applied it retroactively.
The minority of the court was composed of Justices Michael A. Mus-
manno, Herbert B. Cohen and Michael J. Eagen. Justice Musmanno's
minority opinion was similar to the majority opinion in President and
Director's of Georgetown College v. Hughes,1 4 challenging every
basis upon which charitable immunity could rely. At the present time
only five of the justices who decided the Michael case are sitting on
this court. They are the three dissenters (Justices Musmanno, Cohen
and Eagen) and two members of the majority (Justice Bell, now
Chief Justice, and Justice Benjamin R. Jones). The two new justices
will probably be the determining factor when this doctrine is again
before the court. These two new justices are Henry X. O'Brien and
Samuel J. Roberts.
Since these two justices joined the court they have participated in
a number of cases involving public policy and stare decisis, the same
issues that were involved in the Michael decision. The collateral cases
chosen for comparison are Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation v.
White Cross Stores, Inc. No. 6,15 Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water
Company16 and Malter v. South Pittsburgh Water Company and
Whitehall Borough.1 7 In Mathieson the issue was the constitution-
13. The public policy-stare decisis argument in this area apparently was
first expounded in Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951).
14. 130 F.2d 810 (U.S. App. D.C. 1942).
15. 414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 (1964).
16. 414 Pa. 199 (1964).
17. 414 Pa. 231, 198 A.2d 850 (1964).
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ality of the Fair Trade Act1 8 as applied to non-signers of "Fair
Trade" price maintenance contracts. The defendant conceded that he
had violated the statute,' 9 but challenged its constitutionality. The
court began its opinion, after citing its disfavor of fair trade laws,
by restricting its inquiry to ".... the legal aspects involved. It is not
for us to enunciate public policy. That responsibility rests with the
legislature and is for that body alone to resolve." '2 0 This appears
consistent with Michael, but after finding the act unconstitutional
the court had occasion to say:
It may be advanced that despite the above conclusion [un-
constitutionality], we should permit the ruling in Burche2 1
... to stand in deference to the principle of Stare Decisis.
While it is true that great considerations should always
be accorded precedent, especially one of long standing and
general acceptance, it doesn't necessarily follow that a rule
merely established by precedent is infallible. Moreover, the
courts should not perpetrate error solely for the reason that
a previous decision although erroneous, has been rendered
on a given question. This is particularly true where no fixed
rights of property are involved or where great injustice or
injury will result by following the previous erroneous deci-
sion. If it is wrong it should not be continued. Judicial
honesty dictates corrective action. 2 2
Taking this at its plain meaning the court has stated its intent to
require stare decisis to yield, regardless of its perpetuity, where the
reason for the law has been proven in error. These are dangerous
words to those who claim stare decisis and public policy as founda-
tions for charitable immunity.
In this case, the majority was composed of the three dissenters in
the Michael case (Justices Michael A. Musmanno, Herbert B. Cohen
and Michael J. Eagen), plus the two new justices (Justices Henry
X. O'Brien and Samuel J. Roberts). The minority was composed of
18. 73 P.S. §8.
19. White Cross willfully and knowingly sold Squibb products at less than
the price required by the manufacturer Olin Mathieson. While White Cross had
not agreed on price with Olin Mathieson, the. Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act
required it to sell at no less than the minimum price agreed upon by Olin
Mathieson and any other outlet. See 73 P.S. §8.
20. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. White Cross Stores, supra note 15
at 98, 199 A.2d at 267.
21. Burche Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1951).
This case held the same statute to be constitutional.
22. Supra note 15 at 100, 199 A.2d at 268.
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the two remaining justices from Michael (Justices Benjamin R. Jones
and Chief Justice John C. Bell). Chief Justice Bell, citing the impor-
tant aspect of the case, stated his personal dislike for fair trade but
".. . it is for the Legislature .. . to enunciate public policy in this
field. Nevertheless, today, this Court once again treats the principle
of stare decisis as virtually obsolete" 23 in reference to overruling
a statute sustained generally since 1935 and constitutionally since
1955. Justice Benjamin R. Jones in dissent felt that it was an
economic attack upon fair trade properly addressable to the legis-
lature and not the court. The authors of a Duquesne University Law
Review article 2 4 establish a case of early dislike and restrictions laid
upon this statute by judges as a matter of public policy.
Thus, since the days of the enactment of Fair Trade, the
judicial branch of our government has limited the Act's
application. The frequency with which todays highest state
courts are eliminating the Act indicates a definite dislike of
the economic effects of such legislation. In Pennsylvania,
since the Act was first declared constitutional, the courts
have continued to limit its use citing for their reason the
economic unsoundness of imposing restrictions on competi-
tion. 2 5
The court in Mathieson renounces stare decisis as a means of per-
petuating error where it can find an adequate reason for doing so,
even to find a statute unconstitutional where there are definite over-
tones of strong economic dislike. The flavor of public policy is strong
when the court decides that the child of the depression, having
reached thirty years of age, must die having served its purpose.
Having resolved the court's position on stare decisis and seeing the
undercurrent of public policy, let us go on, reserving the argument
that this case differs from the charitable immunity cases because
of the substantial property rights involved in the charitable im-
munity cases.
Turning to the Doyle and Malter decisions, we find Justices Michael
A. Musmanno, Henry X. O'Brien, Samuel J. Roberts and Michael J.
Eagen in majority, with Justices Benjamin R. Jones and Herbert B.
Cohen in dissent. These decisions place case law established as early
as 1871 in serious danger of being overruled. 2 6 In both cases build-
23. Supra note 15 at 102, 199 A.2d at 269.
24. The Demise of Fair Trade in Pennsylvania: A Study in Judicial Dis-
enchantment, 2 Duquesne U. L. Rev. 297 (1964).
25. Id. at p. 303.
26. Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. 420, 8 Atl. 272 (1871).
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ings were destroyed by fire because of improperly maintained water
hydrants, which could have been averted but for this condition.2 7
The Pennsylvania Court reasons, the case is
... squarely within the rule that where a party to a contract
assumes a duty to the other party to a contract, and it is
foreseeable that a breach of that duty will cause injury to
some third person not a party to the contract, the contract-
ing party owes a duty to all those falling within the fore-
seeable orbit of risk of harm. 28
In Malter the municipality was held liable for failure to maintain
the system.
Did the act of negligence occur during the performance of a
governmental or a proprietary function? Once it is deter-
mined that the negligence occurred while the municipality
was engaged in a proprietary function, liability inevitably
attaches. 2 9
These decisions place Pennsylvania with the minority of jurisdictions
but with the noted legal commentators. Moch v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 30 the case cited as the foundation for non-liability of water com-
panies and municipalities in these circumstances has been severely
criticised because of its legal analysis, but lauded solely on public
policy grounds. 3 1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished
Malter and Doyle from Moch upon their facts, but rejected Moch's
policy considerations. It also attempts to distinguish it from all
other Pennsylvania cases, where supplying water was discretionary
and nothing was done to carry it out. But the Pennsylvania Court
criticizes statements to this effect in the Moch case, such as "The
failure . . . to furnish an adequate supply of water is at most the
denial of a benefit. It is not the commission of a wrong.' ' 32 Justice
Michael A. Musmanno, the author of the opinion, emphasizes,
Something possibly could be said about the practicality of
shielding water companies from heavy financial burdens in
their infancy.., but water companies have left their cradles
long ago and must accept adult responsibilities as all other
public utilities are required to shoulder it. 3
27. Since defendants demurred in the lower court, the allegations in the
complaint were accepted as true.
28. Supra note 16 at 207.
29. Supra note 17 at 237, 198 A.2d at 853.
30. 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
31. See 13 Cornell L. Q. 616 (1928), PRoSSER, TORTS §99 (3d ed. 1964).
32. Supra note 16 at 214.
33. id. at 216.
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To continue such a policy of immunity to water companies, would
"... invite progressive inattention and indifference to protection
against the scourge of flame and incendiary invasion."'3 4 The court
found the policy of the law requiring,
Any legal entity which commits a wrong is bound by law
to restore the injured person to status quo . . . regardless
of what the malfeasant may have to undergo in accomplish-
ing that act of justice, 3 5
was more important than the increased costs resulting therefrom.
The court asked why water companies should not protect themselves
by insurance as do other businesses (emphasis added). Can it be
then that the court will not require that stare decisis depend upon
an adequate basis, other than self-perpetuation, and that the public
policy argument of charitable immunities is subject to attack on its
basic premises. An important factor to be noted in Malter and Doyle
is that Justice Henry X. O'Brien has joined with Justice Michael A.
Musmanno in this opinion, and they have placed insurance in the pic-
ture as a consideration in imposing liability. 36
The issue then becomes: will liability break charities; scare away
contributors; and have charities relied upon precedent to their pos-
sible detriment? To quote from Justice Musmanno in Doyle,
Throughout the entire history of the law, legal Jeremiahs
have moaned that if financial responsibility were imposed in
the accomplishment of certain enterprises, the ensuing liti-
gation would be great, chaos would reign and civilization
would stand still. It was argued that if railroads had to be
responsible to their acts of negligence, no company could
possibly run trains; if turnpike companies had to pay for
harm done through negligence, no roads could be built; if
municipalities were to be financially liable for damage done
by their motor vehicles, their treasuries would be depleted.
Nevertheless liability has been imposed in accordance with
elementary rules of justice and the moral code, and civiliza-
tion in consequence, has not been bankrupted, nor have the
courts been inundated with confusion. 3 7
In this light, there is no evidence that liability has broken charities
or chased away contributors in those states eliminating charitable
34. Id. at 217.
35. Id. at 216.
36. Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, supra note 11, refused
to consider Insurance as a factor in charitable immunity cases.
37. Supra note 16 at 218, 219.
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immunity. It did not bankrupt businesses nor chase away con-
tributors, nor is there any authority to show it has or will do so
to charitable institutions. Reliance on past case law has not deterred
courts in the past from their duties to apply fundamental principles,
nor did it do so in the Doyle and Malter cases. With the obvious
change in the court's attitude to the stare decisis and public policy
argument, warnings given by noted authorities and the shrinking
strength of the majority in charitable immunity cases, it is hard to
believe that a charitable institution would rely upon the charitable
immunity doctrine and disregard liability insurance. 38
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said in upholding a previous
decision, "the doctrine [of stare decisis] is a salutary one, and should
not be departed from where the decision is of long standing and
rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public
policy demand it."'39 Justice Michael A. Musmanno in the Doyle case
quoted Chief Justice Vanderbilt of the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey 4 0 as saying,
Negligence law is common law, and the common law has
been molded and changed and brought up to date in many
other cases. Our court said, long ago, that it had not only
the right, but the duty to re-examine a question where jus-
tice demands it...
We act in the finest common law tradition when we adopt
and alter decisional law to produce common sense justice. 4 1
Compare this with Justice Cohen's dissenting opinion in the Michael
case,
The doctrine of charitable immunity was wrong when first
enunciated and is wrong now. We should not perpetuate the
wrong by relegating to the legislature our responsibility to
correct our own mistakes; nor should we hide behind our
former decisions made against common justice and the gen-
eral reason of mankind. 4 2
38. See 24 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 380 (1962). "Although the future is not clear
because of changes in the personnel of the court, [speaking of charitable im-
munity] hospitals have been duly warned to take out liability insurance . .."
39. Colonial Trust Co. v. Flanagan, 344 Pa. 556, 561, 25 A.2d 728, 730
(1942).
40. Reimann v. Monmouth Consolidated Water Co., 9 N.J. 34 (1942).
(dissenting opinion of Vanderbilt, C. J.).
41. Supra note 16 at 219, 220.
42. Supra note 2 at 474, 172 A.2d at 794. (concurring opinion of Cohen, J.).
[Vol. 3 : p. 65
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Of importance and certain to be raised at the next hearing of this
issue will be the most recent Oregon Supreme Court decision on char-
itable immunity. The Oregon legislature had failed to pass a bill
eliminating charitable immunity, which has also occurred in Penn-
sylvania. In Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium,4 3 this point was
raised along with the case of Landgraven v. Emanuel Lutheran
Charity Board,4 4 which had relied upon the same reasoning as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did in Michael. But the court reiterated
the proposition that courts had evolved the doctrine of tort liability
without legislative aid and where the legislature is equivocal, the
court will act as justice requires. Certainly it can not be emphatically
stated, as the concuring opinion of Justice Bell did in Michael,4 5 that
the failure to pass a particular bill in the legislature implies legisla-
tive agreement with the law as it is.
If the court applies the language in Mathieson, Doyle and Malter
it is inevitable that charitable institutions will be stripped of their
immunity from tort liability. When stare decisis and public policy
are given the same weight in charitable immunity cases as it is in
these other areas, the charitable immunity doctrine will be extinct
in Pennsylvania.
JOHN W. MCGONIGLE
RIGHTS OF SOCIETY VS RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
Since early in the Twentieth Century, the trend in the administration
of criminal law, both in state and federal courts, has been toward in-
creased protection of the rights of the individual. At the same time,
and perhaps as a result thereof, there has been an attendant decrease
in the police powers of federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies.
The vexing problem posed by this shift in emphasis from protection
of property rights to the present day atmosphere of strengthened hu-
man rights, is illustrated by the rapidly rising crime rate in the United
States. In 1961, 1,926,090 serious crimes were committed, topping the
43. 384 P.2d 1009 (1963).
44. 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d 301 (1955).
45. Supra note 2. (concurring opinion of Bell. J.).
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